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 This is a study of education policy and practice in Russia and the Soviet Union 
during periods of revolutionary social and political change. It begins with the late tsarist 
era and moves through the Soviet era into the modern Russia state, a period of time 
spanning from the late 19th century through to the present period of educational reform. 
The modern educational system of Russia is still adapting to the post-Soviet world in 
many ways. Modern Russia inherited a confusing and contradictory educational tradition 
marked by high standards of learning and achievement along with ineffective traditions 
of student uniformity and standardization. The attempt at democratization, 
decentralization, and individualization seen in the immediate post-Soviet period was 
derailed by an absence of regional or local administrative infrastructure and a deep and 
scarring economic crisis. Teachers, many of whom attempted to maintain the schools as a 
haven of continuity for students, faced the challenge of retraining and structural shifts 
amidst the deconstruction of their country and culture. They were often left unpaid and 
unsupported for extended periods and saw the general decline of materials, facilities, and 
societal cooperation. In addition, following a short period of post-Soviet political and 
social activism among the Russian youth, a culture of disillusionment and capitalistic 
single-mindedness took over. The state is now trying to find an effective way to set 
statewide standards of education, while allowing the development of a regional education 
culture. The positive legacy of the Soviet educational tradition is in danger of being lost 
while the ineffective communication, an overemphasis on standardization, and 
impractical policy threaten to reemerge. 
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 The socio-political culture of a state, particularly one as large and diverse as the 
Soviet Union undergoes constant evolutionary change, the education system adapts as a 
part of this greater system. In any state, as a part of this system, public education is 
closely connected with the social and political climate. The system of education 
influences political life through the formation of public opinion concerning civil society 
and ruling groups from childhood. In its treating of socio-political life, even the most 
liberal education is never entirely ideologically noncommittal, as Amy Gutmann 
discusses in her article, “What’s the Use in Going to School”, even “an education 
directed at maximizing future choice cannot be neutral among all ways of life.”1 The 
Soviet system of education was plainly not focused on the maximization of choice; the 
education outputs were instead carefully orchestrated to fulfill state economic and 
political needs. This allowed the Soviet Union to excel in science and technology 
education while maintaining the doctrinal authority of the accepted Soviet ideology. 
 The system of education is the most effective and universal form of social 
influence maintained by the state, particularly during the developmental years of citizens. 
As such, it is revealing of trends in public policy and the relationship between the 
government and the people. This is especially true for authoritarian and ideologically 
homogenous regimes, for which the education is often explicitly used as a tool for the 
management of social perceptions and cooperation. From the beginning of the Soviet 
Union, the education system was identified as a vital tool for the construction and 
                                                
1 Amy Gutmann, “What’s the use in going to school? The problem of education in 
utilitarianism and rights theories” ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism 
and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 268 
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maintenance of the new regime. Policy concerning the specific role of the schools was 
contentious in the early Soviet Union and plans ranged from an experimental microcosm 
of a future classless society to an overly political tool of the proletarian dictatorship. 
However, both recognized the political and social importance of education, Lenin wrote, 
“it is hypocritical to say that the school is outside of life, outside of politics.”2 Connecting 
education with the socio-political and economic reality was an integral component of the 
Soviet educational policy, reflected in theoretical traditions like polytechnic education. 
However, the Soviet Union was characterized in many aspects of its socio-political 
structure by a disconnect between policy and practice. 
 The identification of the traits of a system of education is a deceptive notion in 
any state, “the notion of setting ‘national’ aims of education…is rather illusory, as 
policies will inevitably reflect the political and ideological beliefs of the policy-makers.”3 
Even within centralized, tightly controlled education system, such as that of the Soviet 
Union, state goals are not necessarily in line with the goals of educators, parents, or 
students. The development and implementation of a cohesive policy reform are different 
challenges. Edward Dneprov, the Russian Minister of Education in early Post-Soviet 
Russia, wrote of the struggle to create practically relevant change in the country, “any 
work on education reform is inevitably separated into two phases,”4 these are the 
                                                
2 V.I. Lenin, as quoted in Larry E. Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming 
Education in Soviet Russia, 1917-1931,  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 
6. 
3 Stephen Webber, School, Reform and Society in the New Russia. (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 15. 
4 Val D. Rust, “An Interview with Edward Dneprov: School Reform in the Russian 
Republic,” The Phi Delta Kappan 73 no. 5 (Jan. 1992) 376. 
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“conceptual” and “implementation” periods, which may not coincide. This tendency has 
been reflected throughout the history of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. An 
accurate study of the reality of education and the relationship of education to the political 
culture is challenging due to the misrepresentation of practice by educational policy.    
 However, as a researcher noted in an examination of the successes of the Soviet 
system, “a totalitarian regime, having at its unlimited command both the material 
resources and the human energies of a vast country enormously rich in natural resources, 
can achieve much more than any democratic state.”5 Soviet schools effectively shaped 
the ideological formation of citizens in part because of the universality of their reach. 
Through the schools, Soviet Russia succeeded in educating a vast empire of disparate 
peoples. The shortcomings of certain aspects of the education notwithstanding, from a 
largely illiterate and uneducated society, the Soviet education system effectively 
eradicated illiteracy during the Soviet regime and created a respected and successful 
system of science and technology education. All Soviet children attended the school 
geographically designated to them, excepting a small minority who attended specialty or 
national minority schools.6 The ability to offer all children the same education by 
maintaining uniformity among regions and schools was a central goal of the regional 
Ministries of Education. 
                                                
5 Ramazan Karca, “A General View of Soviet Education,” in The Politics of Soviet 
Education, ed. George Z. F. Bereday and Jaan Pennar,  (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc., Publishers, 1960), 3. 
6 Mervyn Matthews, “Long Term Trends in Soviet Education,” Soviet Education in the 
1980s, (London; Croom Helm, 1983), 15. 
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 This study begins with a discussion of the efforts at education reform and the 
early attempts to create a nationwide, cohesive system of education in the late tsarist 
regime. The importance of this era lies in the precedents for pedagogy and practice it set 
among educators and the population as a whole. While the revolution of 1917 marked a 
sharp turning point in creating a new socio-political society in the new Soviet Union, a 
clear demarcation of classroom practice did not accompany the shift in policy. Early 
Soviet educators were themselves children of a tsarist regime; many educators brought 
into the Soviet era traditional teaching methods and values, this group proved an 
important and unanticipated resistance force to the early reforms of education. As Anatoli 
Vasilievich Lunacharsky would discover during his years in charge of Soviet educational 
policy, the population at large was not overtly welcoming of the more radical changes in 
education and society. In his speech to the First All-Russian Congress on Education, “the 
attitudes of the teachers and parents to the new school should not turn out as sabotage of 
it. One has only to hand over the schools completely to the teachers and the parents and 
they will resurrect the old schools and turn people into spiritual cripples again.”7 This 
was surprising to Lunacharsky and his fellow reformers; the difficult relationship 
persisted throughout the 1920s, and effectively unhinged the experimental education of 
the period, particularly in the face of material shortages and ineffective communication. 
The pre-Stalin period of Soviet education was marked by the encouragement of diverse 
educational practices, Lunacharsky remarked, “we do, however, want the teaching staff 
to seek for and put into practice in their schools in all manner of experiments. We do not 
                                                
7 Anatoli Vasilievich Lunacharsky, On Education: Selected Articles and Speeches, 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), 24. 
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want all the schools…to be on one and the same model; on the contrary, the more variety 
the better.”8 
 However, the teachers and mutual blame did not meet the expectations of 
Lunacharsky and his supporters at Narkompros and resistance to cooperation arose. Due 
to resulting failure of reforms, many in the education community accepted the reactionary 
educational practices introduced during the early Stalin years. The ideological hegemony 
of Stalinism infiltrated the character of the schools, inquiry and exploratory education 
ceased to exist during this period. Memorization and unquestioned acceptance of the 
factual authority of the teacher became the norm for schools, “‘the body of doctrine 
taught to all Soviet citizens’ became, after 1929, so leaden-spirited and pointless as to 
defy belief.”9 Education ceased to evolve in any significant way after this point, as the 
writings of Krupskaya reveal the trends of experimental and practical education initiated 
during the pre-Stalin years of Soviet were abandoned. Beginning in the early 1930s, ideas 
were so heavily politicized as to make discussion and theoretical change nearly 
impossible. Pragmatism and the interests of the Soviet state determined the structure of 
schools and the nature of learning. 
In education, as in other fields, the mobilization of thought was reflected in 
sweeping changes in the early 1930s when the relatively untrammeled 
experimental ideas of the first years after the revolution gave place to the 
practical, purposive criteria of the Five-Year Plans…the shift in Soviet 
educational thought ran parallel to those in other disciplines- from determinism to 
activism, from idealism to realism, from the hopes raised by progressive theory to 
the realities of social demand10 
                                                
8 Lunacharsky, On Education, 24. 
9 David Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 9. 
10 Robert Conquest, ed., The Politics of Ideas in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1967), 30. 
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 Beginning just before the advent of Perestroika, the government acknowledged 
that the system of education had fallen behind the times and was not fulfilling the needs 
of the state or children. With Perestroika and Glasnost, educators and the public became 
involved in the debate over the needs of the schools and the direction for change. From 
the established educational researchers arose a group of reformers and activists for radical 
change; they were joined by teacher reformers, who met in small groups around the 
country called Eureka Clubs. Edward Dneprov and his followers were an integral part of 
this movement, and with the appointment of Dneprov as Minister of Education the radical 
reformers took control of the state policy on education. However, Dneprov’s radical 
alteration of the system failed to account for the instability and insecurity in the country 
at the time. His policies lost support before they could take effect and he was removed 
from office. Mark Johnson wrote of the  position of the reform movements, and the 
incompatibility with the national climate at the time: 
Rapid decentralization exacerbated the administrative and financial chaos in 
regional and local education that was further inflamed by hyperinflation in 1992. 
The reformers overestimated the capacity of local officials and teachers to 
respond to the new demands, and the failed to anticipate the professional and 
public outrage at the seeming abrogation of the states’ commitment to free, 
public, and secular compulsory education.11  
  
 Reform since Dneprov has lacked decisiveness and continuity, “Dneprov…argues 
that the ministry under his successor Evgenii Tkachenko, has engaged in mere “pseudo-
policy,” has been paralyzed incompetence and intellectual inertia”12 In addition, the 
                                                
11 Mark S. Johnson, “Visionary Hopes and Technocratic Fallacies in Russian Education,” 
JSTOR Comparative Education Review, 41, No. 2 (May, 1997): 220. 
12 Johnson, “Visionary Hopes and Technocratic Fallacies,” 220 
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economic situation of the late 1990s in Russia made any effective reform unlikely and the 
successful decentralization of the schools impossible. Since the new millennium, the 
education system has been largely untouched, reforms have not effectively altered the 
situation and, many claim, schools still resemble in many ways the stagnated system of 
the late-Soviet era. Recent attempts have been made to modernize schools and 
recentralize authority. 
 The Russian political climate will deeply affect the future of the schools. 
Education, as Lenin said, is not “outside of life,” the Russian system of education has 
always reflected the political trends and sometimes, as was the case in the late 1920s and 
the early 1990s, anticipated the coming changes in political culture. “Politics and 
education are symbiotic variables in all societies. Each is interwoven with the other and 
each is influenced by the other. This complex, symbiotic relationship is viewed as being 
interdependent. Usually the interaction between these two variables results in cooperative 
efforts to achieve the goals and needs of the society.”13 
                                                
13 Frank Sorrentino and Francis Curcio, Soviet Politics and Education, (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1986), 1. 
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I. The Development of a Russian Education System 
 Russian education before the Communist revolution in 1917 was undergoing an 
evolution from an elite privilege to a popular institution. The political and social upheaval 
of the February and October Revolutions in 1917 overturned the growing tsarist 
education system and instituted a new education authority. An examination of the 
evolution of this change, focusing on key periods of reform and change from the late 
tsarist period through the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1930s, 
illustrates the effects political change has on Russian and Soviet education. Russian 
education moved from traditionalist to experimental and back according to the trends in 
government stability and agenda.  In addition, the popular role in Russian education, 
particularly the power of teachers over implementation of reform policy, shaped and even 
stalled government reform efforts. Beginning with the drastic changes in educational 
policies during the reign of Tsar Nicholas II, this section will examine the effect of 
government policy on the structure and effectiveness of the education system. 
Government educational policy in the late years of tsarist autocracy, 1894-1904, and 
inter-revolutionary period, 1905-1917, did not overtly shape the post-Revolutionary 
education policy, but historical trends affected reform implementation at a local level. 
The development of a cohort of teachers that spanned the revolutionary period influenced 
implementation of educational policy. Following the October Revolution in 1917, the 
Soviet government struggled to establish a new education system that would be based on 
Marxist principles and operate as an integral part of the restructuring of society. Civil 
war, material shortages, and general lack of effective communication marked the early 
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years of the new regime and rendered many reforms ineffective. These setbacks in the 
early reforms allowed reactionary educational policy of the stabilized government to 
reverse the efforts of the early revolutionaries. 
 Despite the heavy handed nature of Russian and Soviet governments on education 
policy, student groups have historically been some of the most contentious and likely to 
offer dissent. The liberalization in late tsarist years led to the democratization of the 
education system, creating an increasingly educated peasant and working class provided 
popular pressure for liberalization and eventually for the revolution. The development of 
an education system and socio-political structure are deeply connected; the evolution of 
the current system could play heavily into the future development of the Russian 
government. 
The Late Tsarist Period 
 The last half-century of tsarist rule brought democratization into schools and the 
government made significantly greater amounts of money available for education. The 
secular Zemstvo- funded schools increased enrollment at the elementary level from 
910,587 students in 1893 to 1,324,608 students in 1903.14 A series of reforms allowed for 
the expansion and support of secular elementary schools, in an attempt to promote 
universal education among the peasant population. Long-standing partiality shown 
toward Orthodox religious education, gave way to a more balanced system of support. 
Regulations on Zemstvo run schools, limiting the development of new schools in areas 
                                                
14 Nicholas Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy: 1701-1917, (New York: 
Russell & Russell, inc. 1964), 190. 
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already endowed with the church system, were declared illegal in 1897.15 
Simultaneously, the Church was restricted from opening competing schools in areas 
where Zemstvo schools already existed, unless granted permission by lay authorities.16 
This pattern of development significantly increased the accessibility of education in rural 
areas. In the years last years of autocratic government, the government introduced a more 
straightforward policy of state aid to the school system, breaking with the standing 
system of intermittent grants. 
 The empowerment of the Zemstva was important to the changes in educational 
structure in place by the 1900s. The Zemstva system, created to collect and distribute 
money to enable the opening and operation of secular schools, originated through the 
order of the Statute of the Zemstva in January 1, 1864.17 These councils did not hold 
administrative powers over the schools; the schools were controlled instead by the 
regional School Councils, run by members of the local bureaucracy, and the gentry, 
following a decree from Alexander II in 1873. Many members of the gentry placed little 
stock in the education of peasants, while some feared that ‘overeducating’ the lower 
classes was dangerous. As a result, very few Zemstva granted substantial money for 
elementary education in the early years, and instead focused on secondary levels, 
available to those who could be privately educated in the primary years. This was in 
keeping with the general attitude in Russia at the time; secondary and higher education 
were considered more important to the needs of the country than elementary. The 
                                                
15 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 189. 
16 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 188. 
17 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 131. 
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peasants were, therefore responsible for the operation and funding of elementary schools. 
This only began to change in the last decade of the 1890s, when the Zemstva began 
supporting elementary schools far more than secondary; they still held no administrative 
powers over the schools they formed. 
 Conflict between the lay and church parochial schools came to a head in the 
1890s. Alphabet schools were elementary level schools organized and run by local 
clergy, they had little in the way of curriculum and essentially consisted of the teaching 
of church Slavonic and the memorization of religious texts. While some continued to 
exist due to the lack of funding for elementary schools, more progressive Zemstva 
claimed that “The very existence of Alphabet Schools will do harm by distorting the 
popular conception of school education and debasing the very idea of school.” 18  The 
trend of educational reform during this period moved the population away from an 
incomplete, religion-monopolized education, to state-funded, secular education. 
However, the conservatism of a tsarist and aristocratic society led to constant setbacks in 
the spread of primary-level peasant education. 
The Inter-Revolutionary period 
 The 1905 Revolution, while not successful in a real transfer of power, brought 
attention to the changing needs of the people. The State Duma was created to see to the 
fulfillment of these needs. A legislative body with no legislative power, the Duma was 
ultimately limited to making suggestions to the tsar regarding policy. The first Duma met 
                                                
18 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 161. 
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in 1906, and began offering advice to the government of Tsar Nicholas II.19 After the 
threat of imminent revolution faded, the state was slow to implement the more liberal 
reforms, including those concerning education. The mandates of the Duma were 
extremely progressive, and even with the lackluster implementation they set the country 
on the way toward the expectation of universal and compulsory elementary education. 
Reform at the secondary level was more halting than at the elementary, as the constant 
turnover of Ministers of Education forestalled progress. The more localized control of the 
elementary schools allowed for dramatic changes, and increased eligibility among the 
peasants for a secondary education.  
 Enrollment at the elementary level skyrocketed from the late 19th century until the 
Revolution in 1917. The Duma instituted a series of reforms that altered the structure of 
the elementary school system; they organized a uniform structure and created a system of 
grades intended to create a more complete ladder system in later years. In 1908, the 
government approved a law that made education compulsory and free to all children in 
the empire ages 8-11.20 Over the next several years, similar progressive education 
policies were in the works, but the onset of World War I, and the following revolution 
halted progress and turned education to the control of the new Soviet government. 
Nicholas Hans observed in his book on the history of Russian education, “On the eve of 
                                                
19 George Z.F. Bereday, William W. Brickman, Gerald H. Read, ed. The Changing Soviet 
School, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), 47. 
20 Bereday, et al, ed., The Changing Soviet School, 48. 
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the revolution of 1917 Russia was on the threshold of possessing a network of elementary 
education accessible to peasants in the remotest corners of the vast Empire.”21 
 Education at the secondary level was less homogeneous, and there was no 
straightforward way to meld this into a uniform system. Some students entered gender 
specific Classical Gymnasia, others entered Real Schools, or Real Gymnasia, that 
eliminated the teaching of classical languages and focused on more vocational education, 
still other schools were somewhere in between these two models. The string of Ministers 
of Education that held the office in the years before the Revolution each had their own 
model of an educational ladder system that would incorporate all the disparate sections. 
These systems invariably created a step to lead students from the elementary schools to 
the secondary, a feature eliminated by the government of Alexander III, however, none of 
the ministers were in office for long enough to implement their reforms. 
 A change in secondary schools came in 1905, when the school system 
incorporated parent involvement on the Pedagogical councils. This change followed the 
official recognition of Parents’ organizations by Count Tolstoy due in large part to 
student actions in the fall and winter of 1905.22 On October 14, 1905, secondary school 
students joined in a strike demanding the convention of a Constitutional Assembly, and 
the authorities found themselves ill-equipped to handle the situation; the strike, which 
persisted for as much as three months in some areas, only ended when parent groups 
intervened. The teachers, many of who were complicit in the strike, organized to form the 
                                                
21 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 195. 
22 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 207. 
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highly political All-Russian Teachers Union.23 The politicization of the universities had 
long been a source of strife with the government, and in 1905, for the first time in any 
significant way, the secondary schools took part. 
 A great limitation on education under a tsarist government was the conflict 
inherent between a class-based, stringently divided society and the quest for an ideal 
“democratic ladder system” throughout the Russian Empire.24 It is likely that despite the 
great strides made under Tsar Nicholas II, this conflict would have come to a head in one 
way or another had the revolution not rendered the question irrelevant. “The whole 
period, however, may be regarded as that of the introduction of universal elementary 
education and the democratization of secondary and higher instruction”25 The changes 
made undoubtedly contributed to the success of the events in 1917. Democratization in 
many ways came from the school system as well as to it. The education of lower classes 
brought to light other changing needs and conditions. Developments such as the students 
strike demonstrated the power of the school system, and teachers who were largely 
believed to have orchestrated the movement, at least in part. 
 
 
                                                
23 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 207. 
24 Bereday, et al, ed., The Changing Soviet School, 49 
25 Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 195. 
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II. Change of Regime and a New Education System 
 Immediately following the February 1917 revolution, church parochial schools 
were secularized.26 The secularization and unification of the Russian education system 
was a priority of the revolution, as the education system would be the means to 
restructure society. However, the provisional government focused on a moderate reform 
pace rather than a wholesale abolition of existing socio-political institutions. Following 
the October Bolshevik revolution, the Commissariat of Enlightenment (Education), 
Narkompros, received complete control of this system from the short-lived Ministry of 
Education. As the first Commissar of Education, Anatoly Vasilievich Lunacharsky led a 
policy of educational revolution to match the comprehensive restructuring taking place in 
society as a whole. In a speech to the First All-Russia Congress on Education, 
Lunacharsky declared, “we had to wipe out everything; it was absolutely clear that the 
school was due for a revolutionary shake-up. I shall not say “for destruction and 
recreation” because the schools as an existing apparatus are by no means due for 
destruction.”27  
 Narkompros sought to create an education system that would function as a 
fundamental element in the reorganization of Soviet society; they attempted to build this 
system based on the vague prescriptions of Marx and Engels for education in a 
communist society, “locally controlled public schools which would offer a secular and 
                                                
26 Bereday, et al., ed., The Changing Soviet School, 50. 
27 Anatoly Vasilievich Lunacharsky, On Education: selected articles and speeches 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), 13 
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free education to all children regardless of class.”28 The levels of local autonomy, 
accompanied by teachers and local authorities ill-equipped and disinclined to rebuild 
following a Communist agenda, created a series of issues with discontinuity and 
traditionalism that would make the counter-reforms initiated by Stalin particularly 
successful. 
 The role of the new education system was a source of contention among the 
leaders of the Bolshevik party, and opponents of Lunacharsky contested many early 
reforms. In a speech on Education Marx identified a particular problem with establishing 
a new societal order, “On the one hand, a change of social circumstances is required to 
establish a proper system of education. On the other hand, a proper system of education is 
required to bring about a change of social circumstances.”29 The Bolshevik leadership 
divided precisely over what stage of their struggle the school system should embrace, the 
future classless society, or the present dictatorship of the proletariat. There were 
subtleties that separated individual members, but a central schism broke the Narkompros 
leadership, Anatoly Vasilievich Lunacharsky and his deputy Nadezhda Konstantinovna 
Krupskaya, from other key leaders in the Bolshevik leadership, such as V.I. Lenin.30 
 The educational needs of the Soviet Union were debated by the party leadership 
and support organizations, such as Komsomol, throughout the early 1920s. Central to the 
debate was the basic argument over the nature of the Soviet Union, a state for proletariat 
or a proletarian state for all people. Lunacharsky examines the impact of this debate on 
                                                
28 Larry E. Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet 
Russia, 1917-1931,  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 4 
29 Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse, 4. 
30 Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse, 5. 
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the education system in his speech “What kind of School does the Proletarian State 
need?” If the state is for only the proletariat, then exclusivity in the educational system 
would contribute to the development of the proletariat and the sustenance of the 
dictatorship. However, the dictatorship of the proletariat was, in the progression from 
capitalist to communist state, intended to be a temporary condition. The proletarian state, 
therefore needed to become, “a state led by the proletarian in the spirit of the proletariat 
ideology which lies as its goal the complete annihilation of classes, and which benefits 
all”31 The Lunacharsky favoured organizing education as a “microcosm of a future 
classless society,” as did Krupskaya. Many Bolshevik leaders, in some cases Lenin, along 
with the youth organization Komsomol, felt that the children of peasants and working 
class citizens should be granted privileged access to education.  The children of political 
undesirables and the remnants of the middleclass would be treated as second-class 
citizens or even banned from schooling. The temporary policy of egalitarian education 
implemented during the leadership of Lunacharsky lasted only until the end of the 
experimental era of Soviet schooling at the end of the decade. Lunacharsky and 
Krupskaya represented the utopian element in the Bolshevik party, who “advocated a 
psychological transformation of the masses as a prerequisite for building socialism.”32 By 
the late 1920s, the education system was to become a tool of repression 
 The focus of the Narkompros in the early 1920s was a comprehensive 
restructuring of the schools into a unified, universal school system. This would allow the 
seamless transition of students from one school into the next allowing; this would prepare 
                                                
31 Lunacharsky, On Education, 121. 
32 Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse, 7. 
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the system for the implementation of a mandatory universal education through the 
secondary level. Policy on content was limited to the experimentation with different 
forms of polytechnic education, that is the connection of education with life in a 
meaningful way. The specific content was, according to alignment with Marxist doctrine, 
left to the determination of local authorities. The party only released the broadest 
guidelines as to curricula, at least for the first years of reform, more specifically outlining 
what not to teach, such as religion. Until 1920, the Commissariat of Enlightenment 
focused on doing away with the pre-revolution education structure, and attempted to 
complete a unified, ladder-style system that would equalize the still stratified Russian-
Soviet society. However, the unified school system was intended to create an equality of 
educational experience among Soviet children, not an identical education. This was an 
element of the Lunacharsky-Krupskaya educational policy that was destroyed under the 
homogenization of Stalinist policy. “Unification does not in the least presuppose absence 
of adjustment of the school to the particular conditions of the area in which it is 
developing. The school is variable.”33 
 To execute these reforms, Narkompros depended on the local levels of education 
administration, and the teachers, to share the reform ideals of the Narkompros leadership. 
This was a misguided notion, which was soon evident from the varied and disparate 
efforts of schools and administrators to implement and monitor the reform efforts at the 
school level. Many still operated under the pre-revolutionary educational divisions, and 
maintained the stratified school hierarchies so adamantly opposed by the Communist 
                                                
33 Lunacharsky, On Education, 122. 
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leadership. Through all the reforms and new education  inadequate implementation of 
reforms  
 Early mandates ordered the restructuring of schools to focus on child exploration 
and self-guidance. The new system intended the school to be a place of exploration rather 
than dictation and memorization, meanwhile eliminating many long-held educational 
traditions, such as grades, homework and entrance examinations. Through the emphasis 
on exploration and real-life applicability of schoolwork, “Subjects lost much of their 
significance in a rush to center instruction around the more relevant areas of labor, nature, 
and society.”34 Lunacharsky and Krupskaya hoped to eliminate the divide between 
physical and mental labor, in keeping with the Marxist tradition. This was the first 
attempt at implementation of polytechnic education in the Soviet schools. Krupskaya 
continued to encourage the development of a polytechnic system of education after such 
efforts had been abandoned for the most part in favor of more traditional education 
structures. Polytechnic education allowed education to connect to the technological and 
economic needs of society without creating a system of early specialization, favored by 
technical groups. More than a decade after the formation of the Soviet Union, Krupskaya 
was writing in support of building a polytechnic school system, “the need for machinery 
awakes an interest in technology not only in scientist but among the broad masses…now 
it is necessary to cultivate this interest skillfully and channel it in the proper direction.”35 
In addition to exhibiting the continued search for a method of education that fulfilled the 
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needs of the economy, Krupskaya’s continued lobbying for a polytechnic schooling 
system illustrates that as of 1929, the reform efforts of Narkompros a decade earlier had 
failed.  
 There was a great deal of experimentation and change during this periods, as a 
result education styles and standards varied greatly from one region to another. The 
differences between the policies of the Petrograd Department of Education and the 
Moscow Department of Education in the late 1910s and early 1920s illustrates this early 
disconnect. Petrograd called for a combination of new and old techniques, with a syllabus 
and timetable designated for each grade and specific skill and knowledge sets for each 
age group. In contrast, Moscow implemented a system of “thematic study, aesthetic 
training, games, and handicrafts.”36 While the creation of a single co-educational ladder 
system, first attempted during the late tsarist era, was achieved early in the communist 
era, as least officially. Narkompros banned the pre-revolutionary school divisions. 
Realistically, reports as late at the early 1920s showed that some regions were still using 
the titles of Gymnasia, vocational schools, and the like for official reporting. The 
individual regions did not have the means or knowledge to adjust the schools to the new 
system demanded by Narkompros. Disunity of reform implementation, due in part to the 
inadequate communication, allowed the counter-reforms and politicization of the late 
1920s to easily gain foothold in the schools. 
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Reform Setbacks and the Restructuring of Narkompros 
 As Holmes states in his examination of Soviet education policy, “The naïveté 
dominant at Narkompros stemmed, in part, from its’ leaders’ focus on the future.”37 The 
indiscriminate rejection of pre-revolutionary structures failed to account for the great 
improvements in the Russian education in recent years and alienated the teachers trained 
in pre-revolutionary methods. While inequitable and backwards practices were still 
widespread,38 existing schools had dramatically increased attendance in an effort to 
promote universal, democratic education. Lunacharksy denounced uncooperative 
teachers as anti-progress and ineffective in a series of speeches on education given in the 
early 1920s, this attitude did not encourage cooperation, and reform stagnated.39 Overall, 
the policies of Narkompros from 1917 through 1920 marked a complete separation from 
the reality of the country’s situation. 40 The country was torn apart by civil war, and the 
Russian people as a whole were not prepared for the new curricula and educational 
structures immediately following the revolution. The elimination of religion in schools 
was upsetting to the population, particularly in rural areas, the reactions of some parents 
became violent when teachers attempted to remove crucifixes from the schoolhouse. This 
was not the norm, most teachers and schools simply refused to implement the policies. 
 In a tour of the countryside, to investigate the manner and effectiveness of reform 
implementation, Krupskaya found that there was little change in many parts of the 
country, “she found that most teachers resented Bolshevik rule and Narkompros’ plans. 
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They opposed innovations in teaching methods and the curriculum, scorned labor as a 
subject, and refused to share authority with their pupils or the local population.”41 The All 
Russian Teachers Union, organized a strike, many teachers refused to work for months 
until Narkompros changed their practices.  
The Failure of Reforms, Debate over Labor and Politicization of Soviet Education 
 Before 1920, Narkompros had almost complete control over education policy. 
The education system they inherited was a part of a war-torn society, a still heavily 
illiterate population that was not supportive of the atheistic, radical Bolshevik policies, 
particularly not in the schools. The reforms were not compatible with the values of the 
people; they were overly ambitious, poorly communicated, and faced criticism within 
both the party leadership and the local ministries. Documents intended to explicate vague 
reform orders arrived at schools poorly printed on dark paper with lines missing, 
rendering them ineffective and often illegible. The poor communication coupled with 
dissent from the local population made it nearly impossible for teachers to begin 
reorganizing schools, had they wanted to. 
 In response to the dramatic failure of the Narkompros reforms from 1917 to 1919, 
by late 1920 the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), the Party’s Central 
Committee and Lenin joined the parents, teachers, and local education boards, in 
criticizing the policies of Narkompros.42 In an effort to remove authority from 
Lunacharsky, the Sovnarkom announced the reorganization of the Commissariat of 
Enlightenment. The change removed power from the leadership of Lunacharsky and 
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Krupskaya, and redistributed it to groups more in line with the common view of a strong 
labor base for schools. The change put the administration of vocational schools, special 
courses, technicums, and higher educational institutions under the new Main 
Administration for Professional-Technical Education (Glavprofobr).43 The new 
administration immediately modified the role of labor in secondary schools, and 
announced, in late 1920, that it would introduce specialized technical curricula for the 
upper levels of secondary schools. Lunacharsky and Krupskaya were adamantly opposed 
to the policies of Glavprofobr, holding that early specialization eliminated the Soviet 
policy of an equal education. The debates over the manner and method of labor inclusion 
into schools was a contentious issue 
 The system set up by Lunacharsky and Krupskaya was organized to break down 
the divide between physical and intellectual work through the slow introduction of age-
appropriate labor into schools.44 However, the plan was poorly developed, the teachers 
were not adequately trained to educate children on labor any more than they were to 
implement the other extensive reforms outlined by Narkompros; Krupskaya, in fact, 
intended for polytechnic education to incorporate professionals, “it is not possible to 
assign polytechnical education to teachers. In this case, participation by all types and 
categories of specialists is vital.”45 In the absence of implementing this aspect of 
polytechnic education, the tasks were left to untrained teachers. The intended work of 
tasks such as training in a school workshop, or agricultural work in the school plot 
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reduced to cleaning the schoolhouse, or other menial labor. The Youth Communist 
League, Komsomol, was one of the earliest and strongest opponents with the education 
policies of Narkompros, and tried repeatedly to discredit their efforts. 
 Beginning with the first Komsomol conference in the fall of 1918, the group 
called for the rejection of Narkompros reforms in favor of a stronger labor focus and 
rejection of traditional school curriculum. Komsomol claimed that the secondary schools 
were still pre-revolutionary in curriculum and structure, and did not cater to the need of 
the working class students. Komsomol was correct in many of their criticisms. Older 
students, who already worked in factories, were unable to attend the full-time schools that 
were the only official option under Narkompros, and when they did attend had a difficult 
time relating to the instruction material. Komsomol proposed, as an alternative, 
vocational and technical schools, but gave no advice or instruction as to the formation of 
these schools. Lunacharsky and Krupskaya thought that polytechnic schools, in which 
labor was integrated as a component of the school day, was the only productive way to 
offer students a full general education, while preparing them for participation in the 
socialist workforce. They argued that the early specialization, as suggested by 
Komsomol, would limit students and perpetuate the ignorance so prevalent in the Russian 
working-class.46 The debate over the role of labor in education and students in the labor 
force was to color educational policy the Soviet schools  
 Lunacharsky managed to sustain the Narkompros secondary education course 
until the First Party Conference on Education, which took place from December 31, 1920 
                                                
46 Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse, 22. 
 27 
to January 4, 1921.47 However, the inadequate success of Narkompros-led reforms, 
already evident in the modification of the internal structure, put the Commissariat of 
Enlightenment at odds with the delegates of the conference. The role of labor in 
education was the central point of the conference, and the delegations were disinclined to 
accept proposals from Lunacharsky and Krupskaya. In a last attempt to compromise, 
Krupskaya prepared for the conference a set of theses, which outlined a greater role for 
labor in the education system, while still limiting complete specialization. The theses 
instructed cooperation of the schools with industry to provide real labor training, but 
forewent specialization until students reached 16 years.48 The attempt failed and the 
conference voted for a completely different system. The delegations called for a system 
alternative to the secondary school as in place, which they slandered as a bourgeois 
relic.49  
 Krupskaya feared that the decision would destroy the existing system of education 
and asked Lenin to intervene on behalf of an autonomous secondary system. While this 
action saved elements of Krupskaya’s polytechnic schools, the intervention removed the 
last remnants of autonomy over education reform from Narkompros and invited the 
Central Committee to control educational policy. The change became immediately 
apparent, Lenin stepped in and prevented the elimination of the existing secondary school 
system, and at the same time outlined his vision for education in the Soviet Union. He 
believed that the Commissariat should focus less on reforming educational structure and 
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methods, and contribute more directly in determining the curricula used in schools, with a 
greater focus on traditional education techniques. Lenin said that Narkompros indulged in 
“general arguments and abstract slogans”50 The intervention altered the relationship 
between Narkompros and Sovnarkom and set up precedent for the elimination of 
educational autonomy. 
 Narkompros conceded to the wishes of party leadership, as they had no other 
option. In some cases, the changes were simply acknowledging already existing 
institutions, such as allowing factory-sponsored part-time schools for working youth, in 
the fall of 1918.51 They also moved to create a consistent curriculum for schools to adopt; 
this created more confusion and a new set of reforms, begun as the New Economic Policy 
took hold of the country, causing more shortages in schools. 
The NEP and Education 
 The New Economic Policy almost destroyed the fledgling Soviet education 
system in the 1920s. The schools had not recovered from the shortages of the Revolution 
and ensuing civil war. The cutbacks and limitations faced during the NEP canceled out 
any progress, and forced teachers once again to ‘make-do’ with whatever materials and 
students showed up at the school. Education was not an economic priority, and neither 
Moscow nor the local governments could maintain the appropriate level of financial 
support to keep schools running. Teachers did not receive their pay, there was no money 
to open new schools, buy supplies or maintain upkeep in the schools already in existence. 
Many schools closed due to insufficient funding, and other schools instituted coping 
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policies to accommodate the resulting increase in students. Students in some densely 
populated areas attended school in shifts, with teachers teaching up to three groups of 
students a day, none of who had sufficient materials.52 The leadership, both Narkompros 
and the Central Committee, were desperate to find new ways to fund schools. Beginning 
on a voluntary basis in 1921, and expanding through the next several years, the Central 
Committee reinstituted fees for school. Many elements of this period of Soviet 
educational reform would be repeated during the shortages following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Decentralization of control and funding became a necessity of the socio-
economic situation, as well as a reform policy. 
 Due to the economic struggles, issues with policy and curriculum, and lack of 
public support for educational overhaul regression took the place of progress. Parents 
began to pull their children from school, due either to lack of faith in the system or 
economic insecurity. From 1921 to 1923, the number of operating primary schools 
dropped from somewhere between 76 and 82,000 to 49,000.53 It was not until 1926 that 
the system rebounded enough to reach up to 1920 numbers. Throughout this period, the 
government in Moscow and the local authorities continued to debate which level was 
responsible for the funding and operation of schools.  
Early Soviet Curriculum Development 
 In 1920, after the demand came for a common curriculum, leaders began to look 
abroad for examples of new education techniques. Krupskaya was well versed in 
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education philosophy, and the Soviet schools soon showed signs of influence from a 
number of foreign sources, including the American John Dewey, and elements of the 
Montessori system.54 The Complex Method was one of the experimental education 
techniques implemented by Narkompros during the 1920s. The method is not an 
especially important example of Soviet teaching, as implementation of the method, which 
depended on the destruction of traditional subject divisions in school, was never 
successful in most, if any schools.55 “The traditional array of subjects divided the world 
into false categories”56 It is important as an example of the constant flux and confusion in 
Soviet schools in the 1920s. Trial programs in education attempted to create an 
educational system to fit the new social and economic policy under creation and 
experimentation was natural. However, the teacher populations were offered little support 
on a local level and became resistant to radical change, which was soon associated with 
Narkompros and the early leadership. The lack of popular and party support for their 
programs soon forced Lunacharsky and Krupskaya to seek compromise; the resulting 
programs failed to show results as the country struggled from War Communism to New 
Economic Policy and through the implementation of Stalinist central planning. 
Narkompros Compromises 
 In apparent disconnect with the idealistic outlook on the implementation of new 
polices and reforms, the leadership of Narkompros spent a significant amount of time 
touring schools, and looking at the work of policy first hand. In 1925, after a look into the 
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success, or lack there of, of the Complex Method, Narkompros faced that the reforms 
were not affecting schools in any significant or positive way, they attempted at first to 
assign blame elsewhere. 57 They released a manual that more carefully illustrated 
instruction in the Complex Method, and blamed “politically backward, inert, uncreative, 
and disorganized”58 teaching for any failures. In a speech to the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee, Krupskaya claimed that the Complex method had won global 
recognition, and that “many teachers deviously picked on the complex method because 
they found the Narkompros program new and its content revolutionary.”59 
 Krupskaya was most likely correct in her assertion that many reforms were failing 
simply because they were not being properly implemented, however this was at least 
partially due to the lack of adequate training in these methods. Assigning blame did not 
hold off change for long, the failure of the Complex Method became a final failure for 
autonomy of Narkompros, Sovnarkom pushed for a return to more traditional structure 
with clearly delineated subjects. By the 1926-27 curriculum, Narkompros offered a 
compromise with the teachers. They organized the material on the new curriculum into 
subject areas, and provided teachers with “detailed syllabi that specified the knowledge 
and skills to be learned in elementary and secondary grades,” as well as approved 
textbooks.60 Once Narkompros compromised on these points, Komsomol became a 
temporary ally against the technical lobby, who desired the early specialization and 
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vocational training of youth.61 Komsomol rejected this idea because it would interfere 
with the ideological and political training they saw as necessary for a communist society, 
and Narkompros rejected due to the limitations it imposed on instruction. However, the 
issue of meeting productive demands of the labor force would arise repeatedly throughout 
the next decades, particularly in times of economic crisis or restructuring. During World 
War II, the need for trained workers necessitated the specialized training of secondary 
school children, particularly war orphans. 
Departure from Experimental Education 
 Beginning in the late 1920s, noticeably at the Eighth Congress of the Young 
Communist League, Narkompros came under brutal attack. By now, the lackluster reform 
success had gone on long enough to incite a call for new leadership, which the leaders of 
Komsomol began in full force. Chaplin, the General Secretary of Komsomol, declared 
that the only way to remedy the problems was to send in the “best workers to the 
Narkompros apparat to shake it up for new work.”62 Lunacharsky and Krupskaya did 
what they could to further their reforms over the next years, but a continued lack of 
adequate funding and the reduction of central educational funding during NEP left 
reforms and theory to local interpretation. The theory of polytechnic education, “teaching 
of labor linked with the teaching of other subjects,”63 was incorrectly applied to school 
children, either as means for exploiting child labor in factories or through the superficial 
incorporation of labor education without practical application. Krupskaya’s vision of 
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polytechnic education was, therefore, never implemented before the traditionalist 
movement accompanied the impulsion to homogenization of schools in the 1930s. By 
1937, Krupskaya was writing in defense of the official expulsion of polytechnic 
education from schools, while continuing to urge for the implementation that never 
occurred. She denounced the course of school development to A. A. Zhdanov, the 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, “In recent years labor instruction in the 
schools has in effect been terminated. Instead, some kind of craft-oriented “labour 
processes” are being taught, and more than ever before labour is divorced from 
learning.”64 When the NEP was abandoned in 1929, education funding was centralized 
along with other aspects of economic policy and polytechnic education was slowly 
minimized in favor of academics. The general politicization of social and economic life 
affected schools as well,  In February 1929, Lunacharsky wrote a scathing letter to Stalin 
denouncing the recent purges of students from schools, following this letter Lunacharsky, 
along with Krupskaya and many of their allies in Narkompros leadership, announced 
their resignations. 
 Lunacharsky’s replacement, A.S. Bubonov, had little experience in the field of 
education and much in the field of propaganda distribution. He immediately called for a 
greater level of Narkompros involvement in the activities of the Cultural Revolution, 
which Lunacharsky had adamantly opposed.65 The Commissariat quickly became a tool 
of Stalinist purges, and increased the political and ideological indoctrination of students. 
In 1929, in a book published to explicate the system of Soviet schools to foreign 
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spectators, Albert Pinkevitch, a Soviet educational researcher and President of the Second 
State University in Moscow wrote that, during the evolution of the Soviet society, the 
schools must adapt accordingly and reflect the external conditions of the country. “The 
school will of course reflect the existing situation,” this marked a clear departure in 
policy from the goal of Lunacharsky and Krupskaya to create schools that reflected the 
goals rather than the reality of Soviet society. Pinkevitch reflects the policy of school 
politicization that occurred during the late 1920s, “this calls for a relationship between 
the school and questions of politics and economics…this flowing into schools of the 
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III. Years of Repression and Stagnation: Education from 1929-1984 
 The focus of education during Stalin’s years in power abandoned the 
experimental educational practices of the Complex method and learning by inquiry, 
instead adopting a traditional approach with strong political and ideological components. 
Stalinist education focused on the uniform teaching of all Soviet children, including an 
emphasis on the development of Russian language skills in all Soviet non-Russian 
minorities. The years from the early 1930s through to World War II saw a considerable 
draw of power into the Politburo and Central Committee (Orgburo). The autonomy of 
Narkompros, which had begun to wane during the years of Lunacharsky and Krupskaya, 
became completely subject to the approval of the Orgburo. With all final decisions made 
centrally in Moscow, the curriculum and structure of schools became uniform across the 
Soviet Union, at least in policy if not in practice. 
 In the summer of 1931, Lazar’ Moiseyevich Kaganovich, Stalin’s spokesperson 
on education, officially called for a permanent turn away from the experimental 
educational practices, such as the project method, and an increased focus on academic 
success and rigor.67 Due to the lackadaisical implementation of the earlier reforms in 
some areas, the rejection of experimental programs was, in many ways, simply a 
statement of educational reality. Teachers and parents joined the government to make this 
change. Teachers had been left the isolated implementers of the radically experimental 
education policies during the early 1920s, their position in towns often became tenuous.  
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Therefore, despite grave uncertainties generated by Stalin’s’ reign most 
teachers- including the pre-1917 cohort, those who entered the profession in 
the 1920s and those who flooded into schools in 1930s- came to an 
accommodation with a Stalinist state that offered material security, a measure 
of authority in the classroom and community, even if at the price of political 
obedience and severe limits on professional autonomy.68 
 
 During Stalin’s years in power, the curriculum became heavily politicized and the 
practice of modifying historical lessons was cemented in Soviet policy- Stalin became a 
key figure in the Revolution of 1917 and in the formation of the Red Army. 
 Creating a fully literate population remained a central goal of the Soviet education 
system. To this end, widespread reach was required; the reach of the education system 
expanded greatly as the school enrollment doubled from 1928-1931 and continued to 
grow until World War II. During the war, student enrollment dropped by 25%, but was 
back up at pre-war levels by 1950. A central achievement of the Stalin era was the 
expansion of education, this was of vital importance to the development of an 
ideologically cohesive nation and the consolidation of power. The state committed 
previously unseen amount to the expansion and development of the education system. 
“From 1932-1937 the states budget allotment for schools increased four times and per 
capita expenditure rose from 10 to 38.01 rubles a year.”69 
 In August 1931, the Politburo, having drawn most real power away from Bubnov 
and Narkompros, ordered a single, traditional academic curriculum free of experimental 
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methods.70 Over the next four years, the government created a centralized group of 
textbooks, fixed lesson plans, homework, grading system, and every other detail of 
educational policy down to the timetables for each grade. Centralized homogeneity was 
diametrically opposed to the stated polices of Lunacharsky and Krupskaya; this reflected 
the shift occurring in the socio-political culture at large. Following the successful creation 
of a universal, compulsory, homogenous system of education during the Stalin years, 
there was little change until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Robert Conquest “the 
period saw fundamental shifts in principle which are directly connected with the 
emergence of a totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union…Objectivity and the pursuit of 
truth for its own sake-so far as they had survived- gave place to partisanship, propaganda, 
and, ultimately, to falsification.”71  
 The increased politicization of the education system made the schools vulnerable 
to the over-politicization of society under Stalin. Elements of this trend affected both the 
school structure and curriculum. In 1936, following the writing of the Stalin Constitution, 
two hours per week of the seventh grade was committed to its study and the emphasis of 
the superiority of the Soviet social system. However, even during the highly policed 
1930s, a clear distinction between practice and policy persisted in schools; mandatory 
periods of political and social education existed, but often outside of these lessons, the 
schools remained focused on traditional education. 
                                                
70 Holmes, “School and Schooling under Stalin, 1931-1953,” in Educational Reform, ed. 
Eklof, Holmes, and Kaplan, 57. 
71 Conquest, ed., The Politics of Ideas, 18. 
 38 
 Centralized control of education became the norm until the reform efforts of 
Perestroika. The experimentation and change that had been present through the mid-
1920s were eliminated during consolidation of central power under the Stalinist regime; 
there was little significant change or effective reform following this period. “Of the 20 
obligatory subjects listed for teaching in the senior classes of the RSFST schools in 1978, 
no less than 17 corresponded to entries in the 1947 version.”72 Reform efforts under 
Khrushchev attempted to revitalize the school system and reinstitute polytechnic 
education, as developed under Lunacharsky and Krupskaya. However, the education 
community and students, unaccustomed to the true integration of labor education in the 
general schools, rejected the reforms.  
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IV. Education during Perestroika 
 By the early 1980s, Soviet education had fallen drastically short of meeting the 
requirements of the Soviet people and economy. An ideological shift had taken place 
among the Soviet youth that left them disillusioned with the structure and philosophy of 
Soviet schools. The schools were still largely undifferentiated in training, with few 
options for older students to specialize knowledge, as a result, the schools could not 
provide skilled workers for the increasingly specialized technological fields. Reform 
attempts in the late 1950s and 1960s had only superficially addressed the material and 
curricular inadequacies in the education system. Stagnation in policy was such that 
curriculum was essentially the same as it had been before World War II. In addition, the 
curriculum reflected many inconsistencies and historical inaccuracies that had been 
institutionalized during Stalinism.  
 During Y. V. Andropov’s short tenure as the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party, K. U. Chernenko held the position of Second Secretary of the Communist Party. 
The second secretary traditionally held the position of Director of Propaganda, Ideology, 
and Education in the Politburo, as such, Chernenko controlled issues of education and 
enlightenment and was appointed to chair a commission to develop a reform program for 
the educational system. On January 4, 1984, he issued a reform proposal titled, “The 
Guidelines for the Soviet School Reform.”73 The reform intended to address the unmet 
needs of the Soviet economy while modernizing the science and technology programs in 
secondary schools. To this end, the new system would divert 2/3 of the senior level 
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students from the upper levels of Soviet secondary schooling in to new vocational-
technical schools.74 Andropov died a short time later and in February of 1984, when 
Chernenko became the general secretary, he broke precedent and retained the leadership 
role in the Department of Propaganda, Ideology, and Education. This provided some 
continuity in educational reform, Chernenko maintained his reform program and the 
second secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, was given the task of guiding the reforms through 
the committees to implementation. Education was never a priority of Gorbachev’s, either 
during the tenure of Chernenko, or during his own time as general secretary. His 
involvement was “procedural …[with] no substantive contributions to the provisions of 
reform,”75 his interest in education extended only as far as it was needed to fulfill the 
changing needs of the Soviet economy and political system. 
 Many educators were initially optimistic about the 1984 reform; the reform was a 
sign that the government was finally taking a real interest in the practical needs of 
education. However, it was soon apparent that the reforms were insufficient to combat 
inadequacies of the system. The system was in need of dramatic restructuring and 
realigning to fit the changing needs of the Soviet system, and the reform did not satisfy 
these needs. The Chernenko reforms attempted to mollify the exhaustion of the Soviet 
education system. The reforms engaged in several courses of action, including 
encouraging a greater number of students to leave general education for a vocational 
track following the eighth grade, lowering the age of entry to six years from seven, and 
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creating new textbooks.76 The historian Ben Eklof identifies a central problem with the 
diversion of eighth graders into vocational institutes, “survey’s conducted at the time 
showed that most parents thought this was a wonderful idea, but not for their own 
children.”77 Vocational education was introduced repeatedly throughout Soviet education 
as an effort to encourage the development of the workers needed to fulfill economic 
imperatives. However, despite the importance of polytechnic education to Soviet 
educational theory, the general education system never successfully or fully incorporated 
the policies. The true deficiency of the 1984 reforms was the incompatibility with the 
changing society. The reforms were formulated during the Andropov administration, 
initiated by Chernenko, by the time they took hold during the beginning of Gorbachev’s 
tenure, they were already outdated. From Andropov to Gorbachev the Soviet Union 
underwent intense ideological alterations that changed the stakes for policy reform. The 
1984 reforms did not fit with the ideals of democratization and decentralization of 
Perestroika. Following the advent of Perestroika, the partial reform agendas of the Soviet 
era no longer satisfied the educators who wished to see a comprehensive restructuring of 
the education system. Reformer Edward Dneprov wrote of the program, “The 1984 
school reform, instead of alleviating, actually exacerbated the crisis in the schools. In 
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reality, it didn’t merit the name reform because it was not preceded by a sober, critical 
analysis.”78 
 Perestroika and glasnost subjected Soviet social policy to a critical evaluation and 
set the stage for debate over alternative modes of governing and policymaking. 
Educators, many of whom had developed a philosophy contrary the Soviet line through 
their work in the classroom, sought to share their experiences to change policy. Education 
in the Soviet Union had undergone little meaningful change since the 1930s, largely due 
to the lack of debate permitted concerning teaching methodology and school structure. 
The system established during the Cultural Revolution of the 1930s favored a uniformity 
and structure that precluded innovation. Educators were excluded from the formation of 
education policy, and, for the most part, prohibited from making changes on the local or 
classroom level. Policy often did not reflect the needs and realities of the classroom. The 
late 1980s brought forth widespread concern that elements of social thought had been 
irreparably damaged by the years of Soviet absolutism. Divergent thought was 
discouraged or actively repressed for three generations, leading to a society accustomed 
to following the dictations of a monopolistic ideologically based policy. Early education 
reformers sought in large part to open up educational policy to the teacher experience, 
and to encourage teachers to view the classroom as a place for experimentation and 
creative learning, “this shift is both particularly difficult and necessary, because, for a 
long time, teachers’ consciousness was shaped by an inert and dogmatic system which 
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denied all creative endeavor.“ Shalva Amonashvili, a major proponent of 
individualization in education attributed stagnation in the system to a “lack of creativity 
because for 60 years teachers had been afraid of inspectors.”79 During the second half of 
the 1980s, there was a significant increase of public participation from educators in favor 
of reform, these groups tended to push for individualization in the education system and 
increased classroom level control. However, this was still a minority of the education 
community, albeit the vocal portion, many teachers craved change, but on a more 
evolutionary clearly delineated path. 
 In 1989, the party changed the method by which local secretaries would be 
elected to a direct election by constituents rather than indirect appointment. “The process 
was designed to break the monopoly of power exercised by self-perpetuating cliques with 
the Party.”80 The break of party monopoly extended into areas of ideological and social 
homogeneity, perhaps more importantly for education. The removal of Party Ideology 
from the Soviet curriculum opened textbooks and curriculum to critique and left a 
vacuum in content and classroom resources. The perpetuation of historical and political 
inaccuracies for more than one generation created a problem with teacher training as 
well. Following the rejection of Soviet pedagogy, the majority of Soviet teachers were 
simply no longer qualified to teach many subjects having themselves been educated in 
the same system. In addition, economic insecurity made the rapid production of new 
resources a challenge, particularly as the late Perestroika and early post-Soviet eras saw a 
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growth in experimental and new educational techniques that made pinpointing classroom 
needs difficult. 
 Despite the widespread debate within the educational community, education 
reform was not a priority for the political community at-large, and particularly not during 
the Gorbachev years. His administration did not focus on education as a central area of 
reform. Gorbachev did call for change to create an education system that better educated 
the Soviet youth and schools that “fully meet the needs of the day,”81 and altered the 
system by replacing many party members in the field of education. The new officials 
were not all effective reformers, and a persistent lack of action arose from the widespread 
debates over the direction of policy reform. However, the Academy of Pedagogical 
Sciences of the USSR (APN) controlled the development of Soviet educational pedagogy 
through a monopoly on educational research. The APN rejected most grassroots early 
reform efforts during Perestroika, criticizing teachers for interfering in areas of 
educational theory for which they were not qualified. The APN maintained that 
educational practice should continue to reflect policy, as developed according to their 
research, rather than policy reflecting the classroom practice. The APN held a monopoly 
over the development of pedagogy in the Soviet Union since its establishment following 
World War II. The realities of the classroom were increasingly divorced from the 
development of theory. In the late 1980s the “Creative Union of Teachers” and the 
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reawakening of the “Pedagogy of Cooperation,” focused on removing this separation and 
creating policy and theory based on needs of the classroom.82  
 Criticism of the APN policies arose both from external teacher reform groups and 
from within the organization. Edward Dneprov, future Russian Minister of Education, 
was on such internal critic. His strong objections to the policies of the APN and 
skepticism of their ability to adopt policies in fitting with the  
Even now, when the Communist Party has irreversibly adopted a course of 
expanding socialist democracy, when in Gorbachev’s words, “it is either 
democratization or inertia and conservatism: there is no third way,” we are 
still reluctant to take the smallest step towards democratization of school 
affairs.83 
 
 Debate within the educational community was forthcoming following the advent 
of Perestroika, but consensus was not; the future of education remained murky, and a 
coherent policy of education in Russia ceased to exist. The end of Communist Party 
dominance opened methodology to disputing theories that had been blocked by party 
ideology since the Cultural Revolution in the mid to late 1920s. The field of educational 
theory was open to debate for the first time since the early years of the Soviet Union. This 
was undoubtedly the most significant contribution of the government to educational 
reform during the era.  
 An outpouring of criticism and ideas arose following the 1984 education reforms; 
the debate and criticism was channeled in a “War of the Media” by late 1986. Vladimir 
Matveyev and Simon Soloveichik, two former teachers working in journalism, gave a 
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public theater for the movement to humanize and practically reform Soviet education 
according to the practical experience of the classroom teacher. “Seven teachers issued the 
“Peredelkino Manifesto” in October 1986, which called upon the teachers to rise up and 
carry into every Soviet classroom the “Pedagogy of Cooperation.””84 This was followed 
by two more manifestos of the teacher group all calling for change from the school level 
on the part of the educator. Originally created during the Khrushchev era by I.P. Ivanov, 
the ‘Pedagogy of Cooperation’ was popularized in the mid-1980s by Soloveichik.85 This 
theory of educational democratization would prove vitally important for the formulation 
of policy in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. 
 Most significantly, for the evolution of practical methodology, Soviet educators 
entered the field of theoretical pedagogy for the first time in three generations. Reform-
minded teachers began to challenge the accepted doctrines of educational pedagogy and 
explore new ideas for the innovation of teaching. The education community newspaper, 
Uchitel’skaya gazeta, was instrumental in the coordination of innovators during the early 
years of the thaw. The newspaper “invited a small group of the best-known progressive 
teachers…to a two-day meeting in Peredelkino, near Moscow, for an exchange of 
ideas.”86 The result of the meeting was an eighteen-point ‘Pedagogy of Cooperation’, 
challenging the policies and prescriptions of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences 
(APN). Before this point, educators in the Soviet Union were expected to act as the 
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implementers of policy and research, all of which was coordinated by the APN, but not as 
contributors to the formulation of educational policy. This would become the basis for the 
research done in VNIK Shkola and the Ministry of Education policy under Edward 
Dneprov. 
 Through the manifesto, and two subsequent documents, the group of educators 
proposed a new approach to educational theory and teaching methods, which, according 
to the innovating teachers was “not a particular methodology but the pedagogical 
thinking of the epoch of perestroika.”87 The APN, challenged openly for the first time in 
decades, was encouraged to respond; the exchange pulled the larger Soviet educational 
community, including parents and older students, into a debate over the future of Russian 
education. The conflict between the teachers’ group and the APN led to level of support 
for many of the proposed reforms from a number of sources, including some members of 
the APN and many readers of the Uchitel’skaya gazeta. 
 This encounter can be used to mark the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet 
system of education. Teachers, who had been expected to implement policy to the 
dictations of the Soviet government for seven decades, entered the field of pedagogical 
theory in droves. Previously, the APN monopolized the field of theory and policy, now a 
number of alternative research groups arose, many of which were based on practical 
application instead of ideological imperatives. 
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The Eureka Clubs  
 The educational community came alive with debate over pedagogical practices 
and education policy during the late 1980s. Many educators came forth with ideas 
derived from their own classroom experience and their understanding of the disparity 
between policy and reality. Eureka clubs were the earliest organized grassroots 
manifestations of the Perestroika era reform efforts. The first clubs came into being in 
1986 and the clubs spread throughout Russia- at their height more than 500 existed- as 
more teachers sought an outlet for their opinions.88 The Eureka movement was influential 
as one of the earliest channels for discussion and debate among teachers. Organizations 
such as the Eureka clubs were the most genuinely democratic of the innovations of the 
1980s. They brought out the experiences of those most closely connected with the 
schools and opened up policy and pedagogical theory to the critique of their experiences. 
The sustained influence of the Eureka clubs is difficult to determine due to the many and 
varied nature of their policies. However, the activity created by their existence played an 
influential role in forcing the resignation of the director of APN in 1987, and facilitated 
one element of the creation of a Russian civil society. 
VNIK Shkola  
 VNIK Shkola, ‘Provisional Research Group on the School,’ was established in 
response to general dissatisfaction with the results of research of the established Soviet 
APN.89 A criticism of pre-Perestroika Soviet educational pedagogy centered on the 
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disparity between policy and practice, a problem exacerbated by the exclusivity of 
policymaking and research. The work of VNIK Shkola was structured to operate in 
contrast to this rigidity and institutionalization by adapting to the realities of the 
classroom, it sought to bring the discussions started in organizations such as the Eureka 
clubs into the formation of new theory and policy. The participation of teachers in the 
work of VNIK Shkola was instrumental.  
 The policies of VNIK called for the democratization of the school system through 
radical decentralization and a focus on the individual needs of the child. The director of 
VNIK Shkola, Edward Dneprov, came from within the APN and the group of internal 
dissenters. He supported a departure for the uniformity of Soviet years as a part of the 
overall decentralization of Soviet social policy. He believed that effective education came 
through regionalization and localization of monetary and policy control. However, 
Dneprov and his fellow reformers at VNIK Shkola equated democratization with 
regionalization, which left little cohesive nation-wide education policy and allocated 
most control to localities that had no experience in creating policy. In December 1990, 
VNIK contracted with the late Soviet government to redefine and rework the idea of 
general education, incorporating many of these ideas. However, the more lasting 
influence of VNIK Shkola policy was through the professional progression of Dneprov, 
who became the Russian Minister of Education in 1990 and the education advisor to 
Yeltsin in 1991.90  Dneprov trained as a pedagogical historian and worked in the APN 
until the mid-1980s. As reform movements arose following the 1984 reforms, Dneprov 
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emerged as an internal dissident to the overly institutionalization and homogenization of 
educational theory within the APN. He soon entered the reform movement as an advocate 
of the pedagogy of cooperation and the development of new policy based on the 
individual. Dneprov’s abilities as a researcher and reform agendas as the head of VNIK 
Shkola won him a significant level of support and he became the Russian Minister of 
Education in 1990.  
 Under Dneprov’s leadership, VNIK Shkola developed a set of tenets to guide the 
reform of Russian education reform. The ten points of reform were divided into two 
categories, “external” principles and “internal” principles. Dneprov outlined these 
principles in an article for Uchitel’skaya gazeta. The external principles were “the 
societal and pedagogical preconditions for assuring that the educational system be full-
blooded and vital,”91 they were: democratization, decentralization of administrative 
powers, multiplicity and the legitimacy of alternatives, regionalization and multi-
culturalism, and openness. The internal principles were the “pedagogical conditions” to 
be fulfilled within the schools itself: humanization and a focus on the child; a focus on 
the humanities; differentiation based on inclination, interest, and ability; lifelong 
education; and developmental education. 
 Dneprov’s reform program embraced the ideals of democratization and 
ideological pluralism of Perestroika and Glasnost, at times to the detriment of addressing 
the day-to-day needs of schools. A similar mistake to that of Lunacharsky and Krupskaya 
following the Communist Revolution of 1917, the teachers and local administration were 
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not prepared or trained for the changes being made and soon support waned. Even those 
local administrators eager for change could not manage without retraining the 
responsibilities of reform implementation and decision-making expected under the 
proposed structure. Dneprov presupposed that he would enjoy enthusiastic support from 
the people as a whole. On the contrary, while the was a general recognition of the need 
for educational reform, localities and teachers were neither prepared nor willing to 
remove take on educational administrative or financial duties to the extent Dneprov 
hoped. 
 Perestroika and glasnost created the forum for a critique of Soviet policy and 
allowed for the testing of new theories of governance and the incorporation of new ideas 
into the Russian socio-political sphere. The period also initiated the development of a 
Russian civil society and democratization from the increased involvement of the people 
in policy development. However, while some elements of late-Soviet reform were 
embraced and even intensified following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic 
insecurity and ideological disunity disabled the more radical reform movements and 
endangered efforts at regionalization. Local and regional educational authorities, 
expected to shoulder a large portion of the administrative and financial burdens of the 
new education system, did not have the experience or financial ability to do so. As a 
result, regionalization led to inequality of educational opportunity and a backlash against 
radical reform movements. 
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V. Post-Soviet Russian Education 
 The modern Russian educational system continues to be highly politicized, a 
natural continuation of the ideological unity of school, society, government during the 
communist era. The construction of a new system has been contentious and politically 
encumbered in the post-Soviet Russian Federation. The elimination of Soviet ideology 
from the schools in the early 1990s left a vacuum of direction and meaning for the 
schools. The social and political structure of the independent Russian Republic evolved 
over a period of years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The reforms began 
in the late Soviet years and are still in process more than 20 years later. The process 
brought to power a variety of reformers and counter-reformers as access to new ideas and 
an openness to debate reshaped Russian society. Education in the new Russia attempted 
shape to the needs of the evolving country, the individuals forming the system became 
immensely important to the course of reform. “In our political culture the status the 
leader’s personality enjoys is incomparably higher than the status attributed to various 
parties, movements and state structures (“Though the Soviet Union is no more, Soviet 
people are still here” New Times, No.13, 92, pp.4-7).”92 During the years between the 
inception of Perestroika and a turn away from radical reform following Yeltsin’s first 
year as President of Russia, Edward Dneprov was the most important figure in education 
reform and a radical voice for the dismantling of the Soviet political structure. 
 The construction of socio-political institutions following the Communist 
revolution adhered to strong ideological principles that provided a frame of reference for 
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debate and restructuring. Perestroika removed the assumption to consensus, opened the 
Russian socio-political field to the critique alternative views, and allowed debate. The 
opportunity to dismantle the ideological monopoly of the party-run education system, a 
period of radicalism focused on the rapid decentralization and personalization of 
education. Debate reigned through Perestroika reforms and came to a head after the failed 
August coup. The reformers and policy makers were then faced with the imperative of 
creating a functioning social system out of jumble. As a popular reform figure who 
gained influence during the late 1980s, Edward Dneprov maintained his position as 
Minister of Education following the fall of the Soviet Union. Dneprov’s radicalism 
placed him in a position to carry out the necessary restructuring following the decisive 
repositioning of Russian politics following the coup of August 1991. However, the pre-
coup unity formed around the dismantling of the existing regime was lost when the 
construction of a new system began. As often happens following the comprehensive 
dismantling of a regime, unity among reformers dissolved quickly in the new Russian 
Republic.  
 Uncertainty in political development, a problem exacerbated by the ongoing 
power struggle between Yeltsin and the legislative bodies, left social institutions 
struggling to redefine their societal roles. The inundation of new information left the 
people confused and unsure of the development, the insecurity soon began to take its toll. 
Nikolai Nikandrov, an education researcher in the Soviet Union and in the independent 
Russian Federation, discussed this difficulty in an analysis of the position of Russian 
education following Perestroika. For the first time in 70 years, “the individual is free to 
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search for meaning…while this is exhilarating, it is also profoundly confusing for many 
people.” The dramatic influx of alternative theories of social organization and policy led 
to experimentation and polarization in education; this was compounded by the 
inexperience of the country with decision-making in reform and policy. 
The Ministry of Education and Government Reforms 
 Edward Dneprov was appointed to the position of Minister of Education in the 
RSFSR during 1990, and was then elected to the position for the new Russian Republic. 
His sweeping reforms focused on dismantling and decentralizing Russian education, 
granting the majority of administrative powers to the regional and local authorities. In 
saying “We have two principles that form the pillars of our policy: democratization and 
humanization,” in a January 1992 interview, Dneprov’s main reform tenets were 
simplified from the ten points of reform developed during his time at VNIK Shkola. His 
radical position, which had gained the support of important persons during the years of 
Perestroika, was too divisive to retain support during the challenging post-Soviet years, 
and he slowly simplified his plan while addressing the practical needs of governance. The 
move toward democratization, individualization, and marketization profoundly altered 
Russian education. Dneprov’s reforms attempted to address the Soviet disconnect 
between policy and practice by reversing the process, “we have challenged this tradition 
by reversing the stages, so that we focus on what we wish to implement and then justify 
that with out conceptual statement.”93 However, this provided an inadequate structural 
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guidance for local school systems and teachers attempting to transition from a Soviet to a 
post-Soviet classroom.  
 The division among the political community forced radicalization of theory and 
polarization of policy. The deep connections of the education community to policy 
makers guaranteed that the appointment of radical reformers, such as Dneprov, was 
controversial. Russian political culture was highly personal and partisan. “Policy decision 
and reform programs were often accepted more on the basis of who formulated them 
rather than on their intrinsic merits.”94 The only consensus was that the highly 
centralized, ideologically driven administration of the central government was failing to 
meet the needs of students or society.  The success and composition of education reforms 
in the early 1990s was tied inextricably to the corresponding reforms in other sectors. 
Dneprov appreciated the importance of the broader political reforms and spent a 
significant amount of his short time in office attempting to work out the relationship of 
the education system to the central Russian government, and clarify the division of 
power. Dneprov addressed this problem himself, and warned that “the kind of reforms in 
education he envisioned were bound to fail unless changes took place simultaneously in 
the legal system, property rights, and the political process.”95 Others realized that only a 
coherent widespread reform could successfully ensure the evolution of the education 
system. However, serious issues concerning the logistical and financial management of 
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daily school administration remained unsolved. The longer these issues remained 
unsettled, the more support for radical reform agendas waned.  
 The first education reforms of the Russian federation reflected aspects of policy 
created during Dneprov’s tenure at VNIK Shkola. Decentralization and democratization 
and were embraced by the Yeltsin government as key factors in dismantling the stifling 
Soviet homogeneity. Dneprov believed the way to develop a new, modern school system 
to fit the needs of the new market based, privatized economy was the creation of a 
complementary system of education. This necessitated not only the removal of Soviet 
ideology from the school curriculum, and the modification of education to a child’s 
specific needs, but the encouragement of non-state schools and specialization. 
“Decentralization of the system of administering education is a must, excessive 
regulation must be eliminated, and all those involved in the schools must be 
empowered.”96 This model of educational planning was a rapid departure from the highly 
centralized, dictatorial policy of the Soviet years by focusing on regional education needs 
and allowing individualization of coursework. The plan essentially disassembled the 
existing structures to rebuild a new decentralized system free of the ideological and 
structural traditions of the Soviet Union. Under Dneprov, new policies for Russian 
education stemmed from the reform movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s; the 
teacher-reform groups that pioneered Perestroika education reform heavily influenced 
theories on individualization and humanization in education. The practice-centered 
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theories Dneprov developed encouraged policy that allowed local determination of most 
elements of education. 
 A central problem with Dneprov’s reform program was the lack of oversight for 
local administration as to how they would rebuild the dismantling of the system with. 
Dneprov and his supporters believed that local and non-state enterprise would 
compensate for the lack of central control. His program divided responsibility for 
educational planning and administration between three levels: federal, regional, and local. 
In Dneprov’s plan, the federal level would lay forth very general regulations concerning 
educational law, leaving the majority of responsibility to the lower levels of government. 
This plan severely “overestimated the capacity of local officials and teachers to respond 
to the new demands.”97 Following 70 years of centralized planning and funding, the 
expectation of local and regional authorities to take on the burden of educational 
administration, while simultaneously dealing with the economic crisis underway in the 
early 1990s Russia was impractical.  
 These reforms received support from the intellectual opposition and secured for 
Dneprov an influential role in restructuring Soviet education during Perestroika, 
eventually earning him the appointment to Minister of Education under Yeltsin. 
However, Dneprov was somewhat unsuccessful in turning his theoretical plans into 
action once in power.  His devotion to the he “devoted much of his energy to the political 
struggle at the top. His critics, nevertheless, have bitterly attacked him for neglecting the 
school in favor of “Big Politics” and, by implication, for pursuing his own career 
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ambitions.”98 Dneprov’s decisive leadership of VNIK Shkola did not translate into the 
position as minister. Following his installment as Minister of Education, Dneprov’s 
sweeping reforms quickly suffered from lackluster support and the practical limitations of 
economic insecurity. As Olga Marincheva observed in an article for Komsomol’skaya 
Pravda on May 25, 1991, “Dneprov the minister is not as sharp-edged, and not as 
distinctive as Dneprov the rebel.”99 As the Minister of Education, Dneprov failed to 
maintain adequate support for his policies as he dealt with the practicalities of paying 
teachers and modernizing school buildings.  
 Dneprov’s reforms were largely unenforceable due to the lack of a law on 
education for the Russian Republic. His involvement in the broad  law was delayed by 
divisive factions in the legislature who believed more detailed guidance was needed for 
ensuring a successful nationally cohesive education system. In 1991, Dneprov wrote an 
article for the Teachers’ Gazette in December 1991, Al’terniva, “The tendency toward 
differentiation is a welcome development, in that it opens up new opportunities for 
satisfying personal needs in education and serves as a stimulant to growth for the system 
as a whole.” 100 When finally approved on May 22, 1992, the law divided administrative 
powers between three levels of government, allocating certain duties to the federal, 
regional, and local governments, and greatly reduced the power of the Central 
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government from Soviet times. It also laid forth a great deal of regulations and 
stipulations concerning mandatory specifics of school administration and curriculum. 
 Education systems rely on a stable government structure to develop sustainable 
and socially appropriate policy and structure. Dneprov attempted to reverse this process 
by anticipating the restructuring of the political system through reforms in education 
system by decentralizing and democratizing the schools. A central feature of this was the 
marketization of the school system. The Soviet education system was authoritarian, 
centralized, and uniform, the reform movement embraced the ideal of democratization in 
schools, and equated it with decentralization and extreme individualization. Therefore, 
many state reformists encouraged the development of alternatives in the early 1990s. “A 
major shortcoming of the existing school network is the virtual absence of alternatives to 
the state system.”101 This led to rampant experimentation and the creation of largely 
unregulated, alternative schools. 
 Dneprov encouraged a radical restructuring of the system of education to 
distribute the majority of power among localities and regions, while creating a highly 
differentiated system that promoted experimentation and personalization in education. 
The realities of the fundamental lack of modern facilities and education resources outside 
of the urban centers outweighed pedagogical concerns in the needs of many schools. The 
rampant inflation of the early 1990s in the Russian Federation also exacerbated the 
problems of pay stagnation or lack of pay that arose during Perestroika. After the 
upheaval of 1992, a more conservative approach to reform took hold of certain societal 
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sectors. In many ways, this was a natural reaction to the attempt at a full-scale 
dismantling of a social system 70 years in the making. The Russian people, while facing 
uncertainty in economic and political security, sought the restabilization of social 
institutions.  
 The need for a new beginning in Russian society and politics led to the 
widespread overturning of Soviet policy during 1992. In a wave of overarching societal 
change, old social institutions were disbanded to make room for a new system. Without a 
cohesive plan for the reconstruction, this caused a great deal of confusion and fighting 
within the education community. By late 1992, the system was spiraling downward 
amidst economic hardships and a lack of effective leadership. An examination of the 
reform movements of the young system reported “The deepening economic crisis and the 
instability of the political situation have marginalized the liberal reformist leadership and 
fueled a yearning on the part of many teachers to return to a more stable learning and 
teaching environment.”102 The reforms were not sustainable and failed to gain adequate 
public support. Faced with fewer supporters and a fractured system, Dneprov narrowed 
his scope to a few elements of his original reform movement, but failed to compromise 
on the essential nature of his reform movements. “This commitment to high principle and 
combative passion are exactly what made Dneprov such a dynamic reformer to begin 
with and then, tragically, also made compromise and building consensus difficult once 
power had been achieved.”103 Dneprov’s opponents united in an effort to remove the 
minister from office a year after the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. A scandal 
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involving Russian children’s homes, which fell under Dneprov’s jurisdiction and foreign 
adoption agencies Dneprov resigned his post on December 4, 1992 and moved to the 
position of advisor on education to Yeltsin. Edward Tkachenko replaced him as Minister 
of Education. 
 Tkachenko, while not a reactionary force in education, was a considerably less 
radical force for reform. His appointment “signaled a slower and more cautious approach 
to reform, a time for critical analysis and evaluation of the best of the Soviet educational 
traditions as well as the recent reforms.”104 His policies did not completely reject the 
reforms initiated by Dneprov, but tempered these reforms with an effort to maintain 
certain elements of Soviet educational practices. Tkachenko supported the division of the 
organizational control into federal, regional, and local levels, but also attempted to adjust 
the focus of the Ministry of Education to supplying of necessary resources to the schools, 
an effort hampered by the lack of material resources in the early 1990s. 
The Russian Academy of Education 
 The Academy of Pedagogical Science (APS) faced heavy criticism from 
education reformers and many teachers beginning in the earliest reform debates in the 
mid-1980s. Reformers felt the work conducted by the research monopoly was impractical 
and ideologically driven and called for the dissolution of the institution. Since then, a 
number of research groups had been established, most notably VNIK Shkola, but also a 
number of independent experimental schools and teacher-led organizations, to offer an 
alternative source of pedagogical research. The final stroke came in October of 1991 with 
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Yeltsin’s decree discontinuing funding for All-Union organizations. APS was given the 
option of existing under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Education in on a 
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V. Modern Trends in Education Reform 
 
 Since the reform era of the early 1990s, the Russian system of education has faced 
a number of reform setbacks, including financial difficulties, a conflict between regional 
and national interests, and conflicting views on the educational requirements of the 
modern Russian Federation.  The 1993 Russian Constitution declared that, “The Russian 
Federation shall institute federal state educational standards and support various forms of 
education and self-education”106 This somewhat broad illustration of the duties of the 
federal government towards the schools has created difficulties in maintaining policy and 
funding schools. The central funding of education established during the Soviet Union 
was drastically reduced in favor of regional and local funding. Regionalization, while 
desired by many areas as a step toward freedom from Soviet era centralized control, 
placed heavy administrative and financial burdens on unaccustomed local governments.  
 In general, the financial insecurity of the 1990s endangered many experimental 
reform movements, somewhat like the trend in the 1920s. The practical needs of school 
funding and teacher salaries were not being addressed, this made implementing new 
policy nearly impossible. During times of uncertainty and material shortage, educators 
and parents craved traditionalism and stability in education. When the economic collapse 
came in 1998, education reform was relegated to a role of secondary importance. Since 
the 1990s, there have been increasing levels of concern regarding the trajectory and long-
term stability of Russian schools, “Russian education since the mid-1990s has been 
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marked by increasing signs of collapse. There are two primary reasons for this, one 
internal to the system itself-the virtual disappearance of financial resources to support the 
system- and the other external- the continuing and worsening problems with children’s 
health.”107 
 The reform policies of the early 1990s, initiated by Edward Dneprov, centered on 
decentralization and individualization, as discussed above. However, when Dneprov was 
removed from his position, his successor, Evgenii Tkachenko, adopted a more moderated 
approach to reform, while maintaining the emphasis on diversity of schools. His policies 
combined elements of Dneprov’s policies, while attempting to incorporate successful 
elements of the Soviet era. Unfortunately, the resulting policies did not eliminate the 
problems of unregulated schools found in the early 1990s, and lacked the theoretical 
cohesiveness that guided policy under Dneprov. 
One of the major reform slogans (especially in the mid-1990s, under Minister of 
Education Evgenii Tkachenko) was ‘education by choice’. This slogan was 
generated in an atmosphere marked by an abundance of new opportunities, and 
was based on the proposition that the very process of choice was inherently 
democratic and educational. Many scholars simple equate choice with democracy. 
In her engaging study of democratization of the schools, E.M. Kolosova wrote: 
‘Choice is the essence of democratization.’108 
 
Democratization efforts in Post-Soviet Russia were a fundamental aspect of transition to 
the new Russian Federation. The movements, particularly in the education sector, sought 
to address the needs of the people neglected during the intense centralization of the 
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Soviet system. The centralized authoritarianism of the Soviet system led reformers to 
seek a policy based on ‘democratization’ and ‘decentralization.’  
 A period of reform stagnation followed the economic collapse of 1998, when the 
economy stabilized in the 2000s, it appeared to many that educational reform had done 
little to impact the reality of the schools. The removal of Soviet ideology from textbooks 
and incorporation of different social theories and ideas opened up the schools to influence 
from the outside world. However, fundamental change to the structure and operation of 
schools had never been successfully implemented. The schools operated as havens from 
the uncertainty and instability of the socio-political climate in Russia in the late 1990s. 
The teachers often endured extended periods of nonpayment and institutional 
abandonment at their posts, but remained and provided an invaluable service to Russian 
youth. However, the fractional success of the reforms in the early 1990s and the 
stagnation experience in the intervening years left Russian education operating under a 
still highly Soviet system of educational structure and curriculum without the benefit of 
state funding, ideological unity, or culture of learning. 
Its [the education system] resiliency has been demonstrated…under repeated 
attempts at reform of the system itself, its curriculum, its materials, the ways its 
teacher, and its cost. In spite of these multiple reform efforts, what still happens 
from day to day in many Russian schools looks quite similar to what happened in 
Soviet schools a generation ago109  
 
 The needs of the Russian Federation and the people in modern Russia are not 
addressed by many of the existing schools. Post-Soviet demographic shifts, due to both 
immigration and emigration, have encouraged an increasing consciousness concerning 
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multi-culturalism and globalism. This trend, along with trends of theoretical shifts to 
privatism and democratization among the younger generations, tied with the reality 
discussed above concerning the continuity of educational practice through attempted 
reform efforts have left the education system out of date with the population. In addition, 
while teachers have held their positions through tremendous hardships “there are some 
signs of more open stress among teachers. One example is teacher strikes, which in 1998 
involved 7,695 schools, and 252,000 teachers around the country.”110 The teaching 
profession has lost considerable respect through the transition to the Russian Federation. 
This could be revealing of an overall trend among the Russian people, particularly the 
youth. While education was widely respected in Soviet society, along with the teaching 
profession, the capitalization of Russia and the emphasis on monetary success have 
altered the public values. Due partially to the economic privation experience during the 
childhood and adolescence of many students, financial security is more valued than 
education. 
 In January of 2010, Medvedev identified education reform as a priority in his over 
the next years, and announced a plan, titled ‘Our New School’, to reevaluate the needs of 
the Russian education system and rework the schools to fit the needs of modern Russia. 
The plan, initiated in early 2010, was implemented under the guidance of current 
Minister of Science and Education Andrei Fursenko. Fursenko described the goal of the 
initiative following Medvedev’s announcement in January of 2010: 
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"Our New School" aims at the gradual transition to new education standards, 
some changes in the infrastructure of the school network, at keeping up and 
building up the health of schoolchildren, and at developing the teaching potential 
and the support system for talented children.111 
 
The effort led to the creation of a new Law on Education in early 2011. 
 When the new education reform was released in early 2011, public backlash was 
such that Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister, and Minister of Education Andrei 
Fursenko, immediately backpedaled, calling the reforms too extreme. Vladimir Ryzkhov, 
writing for the Moscow Times, illustrated the popular perceptions of the law, “according 
to the plan, starting in 2012, schoolchildren will study only four required subjects, and of 
those, only two are clearly defined: physical education and general safety. The remaining 
two are the cryptic “individual project” and the highly suspicious Russia in the World.”112  
 Criticism of the efforts has extended beyond the education community, with the 
public wary of the implications for the future of Russian education. Students have taken 
an active role in protesting the changes, particularly those at the levels of upper 
secondary and higher education.113  Public dissatisfaction intensified following a 
statement by co-author of the reform, former Deputy Education Minister Alexander 
Kondakov, “added fuel to the fire by calling patriotism more important than math. "It's a 
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priority task for any state to bring up a citizen and patriot," he told Gzt.ru last month. "It's 
even more important than mathematics or physics.””114 Many fear that the reforms will 
become a tool of the United Russia party to ensure support among the younger 
generations, particularly with the introduction of the mandatory ‘Russia in the World’ 
class, one of only three mandatory subjects under the new reform plan.  
 The reform program, originally scheduled for implementation beginning in 2013, 
is currently on hold as debate unfolds around the plan. President Dmitry Medvedev told 
an audience in April 2011, "We will not hurry with the education reforms. No one is 
going to mess up our education system. We will act very cautiously"115 However, fears 
concerning Medvedev’s plans for the education system are exacerbated by the release of 
the budget for 2011-2013; the budget “calls for cutting the share of federal spending on 
education from 1.1 percent of gross domestic product in 2009 to 0.5 percent in 2013.”116 
 Education reform in Russia is historically highly politicized and integrated with 
socio-political trends. The discrepancy between educational policy and classroom 
practice was problematic throughout the Soviet Union, and remained difficult in the 
Russian Federation under Dneprov and Tkachenko. The current situation in Russian 
schools is tenuous and on the cusp of significant change in one direction or the other. 
Some educators and reformers deem the elimination of a significant number of 
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mandatory courses and the increase in student-selected electives will bring Russian 
education more completely in line with Western traditions and allow for specialization 
that is more effective. This view is reflected in the new reform, which cuts the mandatory 
classes in secondary education to four, including one independent study and the 
somewhat vaguely titled, Russia in the World. However, critics denounce these reforms 
as a challenge to Russian classical education and an effort by Putin’s United Russia party 
to indoctrinate Russia’s youth. The legacy of the Soviet education, and its success in 
maintaining literacy and developing a superior science and technology education, is being 
lost to the interests of modern Russian capitalism and reform failure. The stagnation in 
system of education reflects the theoretical conflict underway in the educational 
community and Russia as a whole. Every major educational reform since Perestroika has 
been cut short by political conflict and theoretical disagreement. The impetus for radical 
change that thrived in the early post-Soviet years has dissipated and been replaced by 
more moderated reform program. However, dispute concerning the course for education 
has stalled reform efforts since the early 1990s. In a 2008 conference on trends of change 
in the Russian political economy, a report on policy trends in Russian education 
identified a source of the post-Soviet stagnation in education. “During the 1990s, there 
was enormous energy and the will to change, but available resources encouraged a 
survival mentality. Since 2000, the economic situation has improved markedly. However, 
resistance to change has grown.”117 Until a comprehensive program for the future of 
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education is developed, Russian schools will remain disconnected from the trends of 
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